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BACKGROUND: Studies before and since the 1999 Institute of Medi-
cine report have noted the limitations of using medical record reporting
for reliably quantifying and understanding medical error. Quantitative
macro analyses of large datasets should be supplemented by small-
scale qualitative studies to provide insight into micro-level daily events
in clinical and hospital practice that contribute to errors and adverse
events and how they are reported.
DESIGN: The study design involved semistructured face-to-face inter-
views with residents about the medical errors in which they recently
had been involved and included questions regarding how those errors
were acknowledged.
OBJECTIVE: This paper reports the ways in which medical error is or
is not reported and residents’ responses to a perceived medical error.
PARTICIPANTS: Twenty-six residents were randomly sampled from a
total population of 85 residents working in a 600-bed teaching hospital.
MEASUREMENTS: Outcome measures were based on analysis of cas-
es residents described. Using Ethnograph and traditional methods of
content analysis, cases were categorized as Documented, Discussed,
and Uncertain.
RESULTS: Of 73 cases, 30 (41.1%) were formally acknowledged and
Documented in the medical record; 24 (32.9%) were addressed through
Discussions but not documented; 19 cases (26%) cases were classified
as Uncertain. Twelve cases involved medication errors, which were ac-
knowledged in different categories.
CONCLUSIONS: The supervisory discussion, the informal discussion,
and near-miss contain important information for improving clinical
care. Our study also shows the need to improve residents’ education to
prepare them to recognize and address medical errors.
KEY WORDS: medical error; medical mistake; medical error acknowl-
edgement; counting medical errors.
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T he fact that medical error is a key concern of health careproviders and the general public is hardly contested. The
1999 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report brought the issue of
medical error to the forefront of national attention and has ig-
nited a series of debates concerning the incidence and nature
of medical errors and the accuracy of the estimates of prevent-
able adverse events.1–4 Much of the research that has been
conducted since the release of the IOM report focuses on re-
solving these debates, particularly what constitutes an error5,6
and what constitutes an accurate estimate of the incidence of
medical error.4, 7–14 Other streams of research have also been
building outside of medicine. These include well-developed
fields like human factors engineering, medical sociology, and
organizational theory and behavior.15–19
Studies from these perspectives focus less on quantifying
medical errors and more on how to prevent them by under-
standing how errors are made visible to those working in the
system so that they can be corrected before causing harm or
how clinicians can learn from errors after they are manifest.
Rather than using data from medical records or other archival
sources, these studies try to understand the systemic aspects
of error as they occur in micro-level daily events in clinical and
hospital practice from the perspective of those who provide and
receive care. And they are beginning to yield fruitful results,
from individual case studies of patients who suffered severe
consequences from medical errors20 to residents’ accounts of
the daily clinical pressures they face.21
The study reported here belongs in this latter category. It
is a qualitative analysis of residents’ descriptions of the errors
in which they were involved and their understanding of how
those errors were acknowledged in the health care system.
Improvements in patient safety depend in large part on in-
creasing the quality and quantity of information physicians
report about medical errors. Conceptually, the ideal process is:
Willingness to Report—Form of Acknowledgment—Access to
Information for Prevention.
This relies on practitioners documenting correctly or
sharing critical information which potentially could be harm-
ful to their image or career. Received wisdom is that because
physicians are expected to be infallible and to function without
error, they are unlikely to document or acknowledge their mis-
takes. But few studies have directly examined these ideas. To
remedy this gap, in this study we focused on the actual expe-
rience of residents in a large hospital setting and sought to
answer two questions. To what extent do residents acknowl-




The study focused on the inpatient setting at a 600-bed Amer-
ican teaching hospital with a large graduate medical education
program. We chose the research site for convenience, but we
wanted a representative sample of respondents. Thus, we se-
lected a random sample of 26 residents from the total popula-
tion of 85 residents and stratified the sample by year of
residency, gender, and specialty (17 surgery, 56 medicine,
and 12 obstetrics/gynecology [OB/GYN], the 3 specialty resi-
dency programs sponsored by the hospital) and asked them to
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participate in the study. If a resident declined the invitation to
participate, then another resident in that specialty was ran-
domly selected by the same method. Only 3 declined.
A semistructured interview instrument was used to gather
data, focusing on the resident’s experience with 2 or 3 medical
mishaps as well as other categories of relevant questions. (The
instrument was developed from focus group discussions with
young residents and experienced physicians.) Residents were
asked to describe in detail medical mishaps they believed they
had encountered. Interviews lasted between 1 and 2 hours,
and were recorded and transcribed. In this paper, we have re-
tained the language the residents used to describe the events
they reported during the interviews. They often used lay lan-
guage rather than more formal medical terminology.
Terminology
During interviews, we deliberately adopted the open-ended,
neutral term ‘‘medical mishap’’ to elicit the residents’ respons-
es. The first question asked the resident to define ‘‘mishap.’’
Responses reflected the range of definitions and lack of agree-
ment found in the profession in general. (See note on definition
diversity.) Some defined it as ‘‘any bad outcome for the pa-
tient.’’ Others focused on ‘‘procedural errors, no matter what
the outcome.’’ Most offered a simplistic definition, while a few
gave more complex definitions.
Use of the broad term ‘‘mishap’’ encouraged residents to
describe a variety of incidents. We wanted to avoid the nega-
tive, judgmental connotations of ‘‘mistake’’ or ‘‘error’’ and the
formal implications of ‘‘adverse event.’’ We also wanted resi-
dents to feel comfortable casting the net widely to describe in-
cidents. ‘‘Mishap’’ worked well for purposes of gathering data
in the interviews and, as hoped, captured a wide range of cas-
es. Because our focus is on forms of acknowledgment for ex-
perienced mishaps, all cases have been categorized on that
basis. (Detailed tables of all categorized cases are available
upon request.)
We also used the term ‘‘near-miss’’ to categorize those
mishaps that 1) were caught and rectified before an adverse
event occurred, or 2) occurred but caused no harm to the pa-
tient.9,22–26 This approach proved useful in our effort to devel-
op a detailed picture of how mishaps are handled and/or
acknowledged as part of the daily routine of a large hospital.
Data Analysis
The main outcome measures were based on the analysis of
cases from the interviews. Using Ethnograph (Qualis, Denver,
CO), a computerized qualitative coding program, and tradi-
tional methods of content analysis, a matrix of all cases was
developed, including information about how the resident
thought the cases were acknowledged. We categorized resi-
dents’ responses in 3 major ways: 1) those documented in the
medical record (Documented); 2) those discussed in some form
(Discussed); and 3) those in which the resident was uncertain
about how the incident was acknowledged (Uncertain). The
Documented cases were further subdivided into those 1) noted
in the medical record; 2) those noted in the medical record and
reviewed at a Death and Complications (D&C) conference; and
3) those reported to the risk management department. Dis-
cussed cases were divided into 1) supervisory discussions; 2)
discussions leading to immediate corrective action, that is, the
near-miss; or 3) informal discussions with peers.
RESULTS
Of 73 cases, 30 (41.1%) were formally acknowledged and Doc-
umented in the medical record; 24 (32.9%) were addressed
through various forms of Discussion but not documented
formally in any way. In 19 cases (26%) cases, the residents
were Uncertain whether or not the incident was acknowledged
(Table 1).
Documented (n=30)
Of 73 cases, the residents reported that 30 had been formally
documented in the medical record. Of these, almost half also
were reviewed at D&C conferences held in surgery or obstet-
rics/gynecology departments. Six also were reported to risk
management.
Medical Record (n=30). The patient outcomes of these 30
cases ranged from minor to serious, but most patients recov-
ered. The cases included missed diagnoses, problems with in-
serted tubes, poor supervision, and poor communication.
Although residents were certain these cases were noted in
the medical record, they were not always sure about the de-
tails of documentation.
In one case, the resident provided the following details: a
nurse noticed that a chest tube was not placed properly and
called the resident on duty. Although an x-ray was available,
he read the wrong one and noted in the chart that the x-ray
showed nothing wrong. The next day, a new x-ray was taken
and read properly, and the tube was replaced. When asked
how the case would appear in the record, the resident said,
‘‘Nothing would be noted that said, ‘Wrong x-ray read.’ The
record would read ‘tube was replaced.’ All these details would
Table 1. How 73 Cases Were Acknowledged
Acknowledged Category of Mishap Number (%)
Documented 30 (41.1)
Noted in medical record 30
Noted in medical record and reviewed at D&C
conferences
13
Reported to risk management 6




Discussion leading to immediate corrective action:
near-miss
11
Informal discussion with peers 2
Uncertain 19 (26)
Detailed tables of all categorized cases are contained in the Appendix
(available online at www.jgim.org).
Note on the diversity of definitions: the Institute of Medicine
report, To Err Is Human, National Patient Safety Foundation
material,1,34 and a variety of studies referenced in this paper2–
7,12,13 reveal lack of agreement on terminology. Lawyers agree
on terminology but physicians do not. Meanwhile, we are con-
tent with definitions provided by one of the great standard dic-
tionaries,35 which defines ‘‘mishap’’ as ‘‘to meet with mis-
fortune; to happen unluckily (used impersonally)’’; ‘‘error’’ as
‘‘to err in knowledge, perception, action, opinion or judgment.’’
‘‘Mistake’’ is offered as a synonym for ‘‘error.’’
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not appear in the record because at this point it’s done, and
there isn’t anything that can change at this point for the pa-
tient. But the residents and attending talked about it.’’
Death and Complications Conference (n=13). Among the 13
cases reviewed at a D&C conference, there were 7 deaths, 4 in
surgery and 3 in obstetrics/gynecology. The 4 surgery deaths
were all connected with missed information on x-rays. In one
case, a 20-year-old man died after he went into cardiac arrest
following surgery for neck lacerations resulting from a motor
vehicle accident. A pericardial effusion was missed on x-ray,
leading to hypoxia that resulted in death.
The 3 obstetrics/gynecology cases involved infants who
were stillborn or died at birth. For example: a pregnant wom-
an came into the hospital with cramping but was sent home
because the resident missed the indication on ultrasound that
the fetal membrane was about to burst. Later that day at an-
other hospital the woman delivered a premature infant who
died. The resident doubted the mishap caused the death of the
fetus but thought proper care would have provided early in-
formation of the infant’s death in utero.
In 6 other cases reviewed at the D&C conference the pa-
tients survived. Three mishaps were described by the residents
as ‘‘known risks’’ of the surgical procedure involved. The other
3 cases included a delayed diagnosis, a resident’s poor sutur-
ing technique, and an unnecessary procedure. In one of the
‘‘known risk’’ cases, abdominal perforation following lap-
aroscopic surgery caused sepsis in a middle-aged patient,
and a second operation was needed to repair the damage.
Risk Management Incident Reports (n=6). Six cases, in addi-
tion to being noted in the medical record, were acknowledged
in incident reports sent to the risk management department.
Three involved errors by nonresident staff, 2 by nursing, 1 by
radiology. In one case, a nurse gave a medication intramus-
cularly rather than intravenously. Another involved a heart
attack patient who had a second heart attack at night. Be-
cause the nurse notified the wrong person, the patient was not
aggressively treated, and the hospital stay was prolonged.
There were 2 disagreements over ethical issues. These in-
volved 1) a resident who objected to a surgeon’s decision not to
operate on an elderly patient against family wishes, and 2) a
resident indignant because an attending physician wanted to
change a record. Adverse patient outcomes in the 6 cases
ranged from none, to lengthened hospital stay, to death.
Discussions (n=24)
Of 24 mishaps dealt with through discussions, 11 were su-
pervisory discussions between the resident and others on the
team, usually his/her superior. Eleven other cases were ac-
knowledged in discussions that led to immediate corrective
action, what we called near-misses. The remaining 2 cases
were discussions solely between peer members of the team.
Supervisory Discussions (n=11). Almost half of the mishaps
were acknowledged only through discussion between the res-
ident, a superior, and/or others on the team. Such discussions
(often at morning rounds) are a routine part of the supervisory
structure of resident education; they are the major way the
work of residents is reviewed and corrected on a daily basis.
Among the cases reported were 7 errors, 2 family issues, and 2
instances in which the resident was caught in the middle of a
dispute between attending physicians.
The 7 cases of errors included the following:
1. Pneumonia was missed on an x-ray and the patient died.
2. A patient having a myocardial infarction was sent to the
floor by the emergency department without proper med-
ication.
3. A young patient with a potentially life-threatening con-
dition (aortic dissection) was sent home inappropriately
because of miscommunication between physicians.
4. A necrotizing infection developed in a chronically ill
woman on parenteral nutrition because of nonsterile
technique.
5. A patient with a necrotizing bacterial infection did not
receive timely treatment as his condition worsened.
6./7. Chest tube placement caused pneumothorax in 2
patients.
Discussions Leading to Immediate Corrective Action: The Near-
miss (n=11). Eleven reported cases (10 internal medicine, 1
OB/GYN) were resolved immediately and designated near-
misses. No harm came to the patient and exchange of infor-
mation was limited to the relevant members of the team (res-
ident, nurses, interns). Six cases involved medication errors; 3
involved failures to make the proper diagnosis; 1 was a treat-
ment error; and 1 involved confusion over the similarity in
names of two patients.
In this last case, the resident switched orders on two pa-
tients whose last names both began with ‘‘K,’’ but the nurse
caught the error. The opposite situation occurred in 2 other
cases, where nurses administered haloperidol in a higher dose
than indicated, but the resident caught the errors. In addi-
tional cases, the resident prevented a nurse from administer-
ing an inappropriate ACE inhibitor, and a patient with a
diabetic foot ulcer was not given medication fast enough.
Two cases involved the use of heparin. None of these near-
miss cases were documented.
Uncertain Cases (n=19)
In 19 cases, the resident told either a chief or attending phy-
sician about a problem but felt nothing was reported further,
no action was taken, or the incident was ignored. Sometimes
the resident reported the incident at shift change before leav-
ing the hospital. Six were medication errors; 6 were errors in
communication; 3 were misdiagnoses; 3 involved injuries from
procedures (pneumothorax, hematoma), and 1 was an unnec-
essary treatment delay. The variety of errors described by the
residents in this category reflects the same kinds of errors as
found in other categories.
Medication Errors (n=12)
Medication errors are acknowledged as one of the largest sin-
gle-error categories. We charted medication errors reported by
the residents and noted the diverse ways in which they are
acknowledged.
Twelve cases involved medication errors, several of which
have already been described. These were acknowledged in dif-
ferent ways (Table 2). They fall into almost all the categories
already described. ‘‘Wrong medicine’’ was sometimes noted in
the record, but sometimes it was not, because it was what we
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have called a near-miss. ‘‘Wrong dose’’ is found as both a Near-
miss and in the Uncertain category. ‘‘Wrong timing’’ is both a
Near-Miss and Uncertain. ‘‘Wrong form’’ appears only in the
record.
DISCUSSION
We started with the goals of understanding how and to what
extent errors are acknowledged in the course of daily clinical
practice. Our results offer a view from the trenches from the
perspective of residents who ranged in experience from interns
to fourth- or fifth-year veterans. The results demonstrate that
medical mishaps are acknowledged and acted on in diverse
ways. There is no simple, one-to-one relationship between the
occurrence of a mishap and its reportability in the system.
Many errors are not formally noted in the medical record but
they are acknowledged in other ways that make them visible so
that they can be corrected or can contribute to learning. The
only notable association was between the severity of outcome
and formal documentation in the medical record, at a D&C
conference, and/or as an incident report. Half of the 11 cases
so reported resulted in death to the patient (n=4) or the fetus
(n=3).
The residents in the interviews identified 73 cases as fall-
ing within our loose definition of ‘‘mishap.’’ If one accepts the
‘‘common’’ physician terminology, some are preventable ad-
verse events and some are unpreventable. However, physi-
cians do not agree about what is preventable and what is
not.5,6,12 Some are near-misses according to the definition
we propose, although some physicians would disagree. Those
who systematically study these events have the difficult job of
developing definitional consensus. Part of the challenge is in-
trinsic medical uncertainty and, therefore, varying profession-
al opinions.12,17
Formal Acknowledgment in the Medical Record,
D&C Conference, or Incident Report
Formal acknowledgment provides concrete, easily countable
evidence of a medical mishap. These recorded forms overlap
but are by no means exhaustive. Although 41% of cases were
documented formally, each form of documentation is con-
strained in terms of consistency of use, accuracy, and thor-
oughness of information provided. In our study, there was
considerable discussion of mishaps that involved serious con-
sequences that were not always formally acknowledged in the
medical record, at a D&C conference, or in an incident report.
At the hospital site where our study was conducted, gen-
eral surgery holds a D&C conference every week, and OB/GYN
holds a similar conference every month. Internal medicine
holds grand rounds but no D&C conference. Interviewed res-
idents reported that the D&C conference is highly educational
for them; they do not feel accused or held blameworthy for
their actions. Most residents were forthcoming about their own
failures and also about the failures of their chiefs and attend-
ing physicians. One resident described the process as ‘‘very
educational.’’ ‘‘You stand up there and say, ‘This is what hap-
pened.’ And we’re asked, ‘Why do you think this happens?
What could you have done to do this differently?’ I think that’s
very appropriate. I can’t think of a better way [to learn].’’ The
D&C conference has great educational potential; however,
there appears to be almost no effort to capture and formalize
this potential systematically or systemically.24–33
The official policy at the research site is that every inci-
dent should be reported to risk management. Many hospitals
are trying to establish such a policy so that risk management
would be an important source of medical error information.
Not all clinicians view risk management in the same way. In
this study, only 6 of 73 cases were sent as incident reports to
risk management. A chief resident in our study noted, ‘‘From a
resident’s point of view, the incident report is a good nurses’
mechanism. But these often don’t seem important medically. A
doctor might phone the risk manager, warning about a possi-
ble suit, but this would not be documented.’’ A young resident
noted that in some cases the resident is too busy to prepare an
incident report. ‘‘Some [residents] wouldn’t have the time to
report because it needs to be a formal letter. . ..So sometimes
we just forget about it. . ..We don’t have time to do it.’’ The idea
that every error should be reported in an incident report also
ignores the fact that errors are not objective facts and they of-
ten are the outcomes of attempted solutions.
Supervisory Discussions Between Residents and
Superiors
Residents acknowledged almost one third of the mishaps
through a supervisory discussion between the resident and
his/her superior. These discussions provide what might be
called an ‘‘oral history’’ of the incident. This form of discussion
is a key mechanism in the supervisory structure that charac-
terizes graduate medical education and how learning takes
place in complex health care systems. The hierarchy of super-
vision is supposed to guarantee that those with more experi-
ence and knowledge review the work of those with less.
According to resident interviewees, the discussions con-
stitute a regular means of discussing a wide range of patient
management and outcomes, including mistakes and adjust-
ments in management. One chief resident suggested the su-
pervisory discussion ‘‘often represents the retrospective
realization that what was done to the patient represented the
best medical judgment at the time, but may not look so good in
retrospect. . . . All discussions involve corrective action in
some time frame and on some level.’’ This captures the intrin-
sic uncertainty found in clinical practice, and the power of
evolving and sometimes conflicting assessments.12,17
There do not appear to be systematic evaluations of these
discussions as an effective educational tool, although many
anecdotal reports suggest that what one learns during resi-
dency shapes later practice style. Further, because the content
of the important discussions is not formally documented, it is
not a source for counting or understanding patterns of errors.
Individuals may learn, but the organization and the larger sys-
tem do not.
Table 2. How 12 Cases of Medication Errors Were Acknowledged
Medication Error Documented Discussed Uncertain
Wrong medicine 1 2 1
Wrong dose 2 2
Wrong timing 2 1 (patient died)
Wrong form 1
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Near-Misses
The 11 near-misses were all handled within the system with
positive outcomes and were not documented formally. In all
these instances, it might be argued that the system actually
worked because the errors were caught in time. Despite break-
downs in communication, human fallibility, and other possible
causative factors, the mishaps were captured within the safety
net of the hospital system at some point before the patient was
harmed.
The near-miss is a neglected form of acknowledgment
with great potential as a model of prevention because it can
reveal peer and self-scrutiny working effectively.9,22,24 Accord-
ing to one estimate, near-misses occur between 3 and 300
times more often than adverse events.9 There is a burgeoning
literature about the near-miss,9,23–26 and its educational po-
tential may be gaining recognition with the institution of root-
cause analyses of near-misses22 and near-miss rounds.24
Medication Errors
Despite their importance, our small sample suggests that med-
ication errors are acknowledged in a variety of ways, and
sometimes are not documented at all. This hinders the sys-
tematic study of patterns of medication error.
Uncertain Cases
Those cases in which the resident was uncertain about how a
mishap was acknowledged remain confounding and disturb-
ing. These represent one quarter (26%; 19/73) of our cases.
Typically the younger residents in internal medicine in our
sample reported the Uncertain cases. Possibly a young resi-
dent does not view an incident in the same way as an experi-
enced doctor. Some cases represent a failure of chief and
attending physicians to communicate with residents on small
details of a case. An observation by an experienced attending
physician who served as a medical expert for our study is re-
vealing: ‘‘Really, major incidents don’t get into anybody’s re-
port. I doubt they are documented in any fashion anywhere,
even though you are aware of the problem.’’
Conclusions
Reliable systems have procedures and attributes that make
errors visible so that they can be corrected before they cause
harm and so that people can learn from errors in the normal
course of their practice.1 While this idea is laudable in theory,
it may be unworkable unless practitioners systematically doc-
ument or acknowledge mishaps or unsafe practices. In this
study, we assumed that practicing health care providers are a
rich and neglected source of information about practices in
their own environment related to error. Retrospective event
histories can offer a potentially novel perspective despite pos-
sible perceptual biases.
Although the results are not generalizable beyond the in-
dividual cases, our data offer rich insights into the process by
which mishaps are acknowledged, reported, or ignored. By ex-
amining the spectrum of ways mistakes can be acknowledged,
it is possible to capture the multiple, untoward events that
take place in daily clinical care. Our study also shows the need
to improve residents’ education to better prepare them to rec-
ognize and address medical errors. The various forms of ac-
knowledgment we have described have not been systematically
evaluated for their educational and/or preventive value. In-
sights about the range of mistakes improve the ability to count
errors, analyze the multiple factors contributing to mistakes,
and help identify factors that can be used for educational and
preventive purposes. The supervisory discussion, the informal
discussion, and near-miss all contain important information
for improving clinical care. These sources are not to be dis-
missed because they cannot yet be quantified.
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REFLECTIONS
2004 Creative Writing Contest Honorable Mention
What City, What Day
I was pushing the gurney
and the doctor walking beside it
kept asking questions of the prone man
who stared back at me as if for help
on a grade school quiz: Who is our
president? What city are you in?
Saints stood like stone lions
on either side of the elevator doors.
Going up, I put one palm over the man’s cheek and ear. He’d
failed the questions. White heat
warmed my palm as the floors blurred by.
Then the man touched
the doctor’s sleeve. Please, he pleaded,
I know people are starving
but don’t let them eat me.
I can find the road. I can
get us to the kingdom.
NANCE VAN WINCKEL
Liberty Lake, WA.
—FROM FINAL JUDGE CORTNEY DAVIS—
‘‘What City, What Day’’ is a lovely poem, a brief moment in which a confused patient, propelled along on
his gurney, is being questioned by a doctor. The narrator observes this moment and all it implies: there are
saints ‘‘like stone lions’’ flanking the elevator doors; when the sick man fails the doctor’s mental status
questions, the narrator touches the man’s cheek and ‘‘white heat’’ warms her palm. The patient, plead-
ing, reaches out for the doctor’s sleeve. ‘‘I know people are starving,’’ he says. This poem suggests the
spiritual behind the everyday, the spark of the divine in each patient. More often than not, our patients do
show us the way. This patient seems to have, in spite of what might be seen as craziness or dementia, the
knowledge of where to take us. ‘‘I can find the road’’ he says. ‘‘I can/get us to the kingdom.’’
JGIM 409Rosenthal et al., Beyond the Medical Record
